Major Marine Programs Are
Moving Forward

The U.S. maritime industrial base is carrying a full order book. Virginia-class and Columbia-class submarines and DDG 51 destroyers are under construction. The Coast Guard is building Offshore Patrol Cutters and its lead Polar Security Cutter, and has reported contracts for 11 Arctic Security Cutters. The Navy is building new dry docks at its public shipyards.

The next phase is harder to measure than funding. Budgets and contracts show intent. Delivered ships, completed maintenance periods and operating dry docks show execution.

Between the two sits a chain of dependencies: infrastructure, suppliers, materials, production schedules and the skilled trades who do the work. When any link is out of step with the others, schedules move.

So is the industrial base ready to execute? The answer depends on which program, which shipyard, which supplier and which phase of work. This article looks at a small set of current programs, what government auditors and analysts have documented about their progress, where capacity is being strengthened, and what that means for workforce planning.

Major Programs Are Moving From Plans to Execution

Program status matters, because "planned" and "in production" create very different labor demand. A few current examples show the range.

Virginia-class attack submarines: in production. Virginia-class boats are being built under contract by General Dynamics Electric Boat and HII Newport News Shipbuilding. Congress's enacted FY2026 defense appropriations included $1.9 billion to fully fund a second Virginia-class submarine that year. GAO reported in April 2026 that shipbuilders were delivering at about one boat per year as of June 2025, half the Navy's goal of two, and that both 2025 deliveries were more than three years late.

Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines: under construction. The Navy plans 12 Columbia-class boats. The first was procured in FY2021 and the second in FY2024, according to CRS. GAO reported in April 2026 that the lead boat was at least 18 months behind its contract delivery date. One more Columbia-class boat appears in the Navy's FY2027 budget request, which is a proposal, not enacted funding.

DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: in production. GAO reported that delays on Flight III destroyers had grown to between 22 and 58 months. The FY2026 appropriations act added $1.0 billion for a third DDG 51 and included $300 million for DDG 51 wage enhancements, according to the Senate Appropriations Committee summary.

Navy maintenance: ongoing, with documented backlogs. In December 2025, CBO found that maintenance on conventional Navy ships often takes 20 to 100 percent longer than the Navy's final schedules. In April 2026 testimony, CBO reported that 33 percent of the attack submarine fleet was undergoing or awaiting maintenance, against a Navy preference of no more than 20 percent. GAO's August 2026 review linked lost submarine operational days in part to limited dry dock capacity.

Coast Guard recapitalization: contracted and under construction. GAO's April 2026 report described a delay of more than five years for delivery of the lead Offshore Patrol Cutter and a nine-year delay for the lead Polar Security Cutter. GAO also noted the Coast Guard reported awarding contracts worth up to $6.8 billion to build 11 Arctic Security Cutters.

What comes next: requested, not yet enacted. The Navy's FY2027 budget request, released April 21, 2026, seeks $65.8 billion for shipbuilding to buy 34 ships, including one Columbia-class and two Virginia-class submarines. That is a request. It describes future workload, not current production.

Workforce implication: Contracted and in-production work drives labor demand now. Requested work signals what may follow. A workforce plan should keep the two in separate columns.

Execution Depends on More Than Shipyard Space

It is tempting to measure industrial base readiness by counting shipyards or dry docks. Execution depends on a wider system.

Physical capacity. GAO reported in February 2025 that representatives from four of the seven shipbuilders building Navy battle force ships said they have constrained physical space, and that some face aging facilities and equipment.

Production capacity. CBO testified in April 2026 that naval tonnage under construction grew 80 percent from 2014 to 2024, from 68,000 tons to 123,000 tons, and that shipyards now need 9 to 10 years on average to build destroyers. More work is in the yards at once, and each ship is in the yard longer.

Supply-chain capacity. Prime shipyards depend on suppliers for castings, forgings, valves, pumps, electrical systems and other components. CBO reported that about 70 percent of suppliers of critical submarine components have no competitors. GAO stated that "many suppliers also have workforce and infrastructure problems that could result in challenges to their ability to produce quality materials on time." For the Columbia program, GAO's June 2025 assessment, as quoted by CRS, noted limited workforce and industrial capacity at component suppliers and said qualifying new suppliers can take years.

Workforce capacity. GAO's April 2026 report identified challenges training, recruiting and retaining trades workers such as welders, pipefitters and machinists. CBO testified that voluntary attrition at Bath Iron Works and Electric Boat was below 10 percent a year, while workforces at many yards are "overall, less experienced than they were" previously.

Execution capacity. GAO's overall conclusion in April 2026 was that none of the seven shipbuilders building battle force ships was positioned to meet the Navy's delivery goals at the time of its review. GAO linked shipyard capacity shortfalls "in part" to infrastructure and workforce limitations, and also pointed to program management practices.

That last point matters. GAO did not describe workforce as the only constraint, and it did not describe every yard or supplier as constrained in the same way. The findings are specific to the programs, yards and suppliers reviewed.

Workforce implication: Adding a dry dock or a building bay adds potential. Turning that potential into delivered work also requires materials on time, a schedule that holds, and enough qualified trades at the yard and at its suppliers.

Where the Industrial Base Is Being Strengthened

The documented challenges are only half the picture. Significant investment is in motion, at different stages.

Public shipyard infrastructure (underway, long-term). The Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), created in 2018, covers the four public naval shipyards: Norfolk, Portsmouth, Pearl Harbor and Puget Sound. GAO reported in September 2026 that new dry docks are under construction at Portsmouth and Pearl Harbor and in final design at Puget Sound, at a combined estimated cost of about $21.7 billion. As of April 2026, the Navy had completed or begun about 100 SIOP construction projects. GAO expects total program costs to surpass $200 billion over 50 years or more.

Submarine industrial base (funded, ongoing). GAO reported that DOD has invested more than $10 billion in the submarine industrial base since FY2018, and that OSD invested over $150 million in FY2025 under its submarine industrial base technology priority. The enacted FY2026 appropriations act included another $285 million for the submarine maritime industrial base. GAO has also recommended that DOD assess the full cost and schedule of the investments still needed to reach one Columbia-class and two Virginia-class boats per year.

Wages and retention (funded). GAO reported that an April 2025 modification to the Virginia-class Block V contract included funding for wage enhancements to improve worker retention, and that shipbuilder representatives described a positive effect on recruiting and retention. The FY2026 appropriations act included $300 million for DDG 51 wage enhancements.

Small shipyards (awarded). In August 2026, MARAD awarded $35.1 million in Small Shipyard Grants to 45 shipyards in 24 states and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Funded projects include floating dry docks, marine cranes, welding machines, plasma cutting tables and maritime worker training programs.

Training pipelines (operating). The Navy-funded Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing (ATDM) program in Danville, Virginia, runs a 600-hour, roughly four-month program in additive manufacturing, CNC machining, non-destructive testing, quality control inspection and metrology, and welding. Its stated purpose is preparing adult learners to work in the submarine industrial base.

Workforce implication: Many of these investments reach suppliers and smaller yards, not only prime shipyards. As they come online, they will draw on the same regional pools of welders, machinists, pipefitters and electricians.

Workforce Readiness Is Part of Execution Readiness

Workforce readiness is not the whole execution story. It is the part that takes the longest to change.

A dry dock can be designed, funded and built on a known schedule. A skilled tradesperson takes longer to develop than most hiring plans assume. GAO reported that shipbuilder documentation puts proficiency in the skilled trades at 3 to 5 years. Training programs such as ATDM shorten the path to entry-level readiness. They do not replace the experience that comes from years on the deck plate.

Several practical factors shape how workforce readiness affects execution:

• Different phases need different crafts. Structural fabrication and module work lean on welders and shipfitters. Outfitting brings in pipefitters, marine electricians and machinists. Testing and delivery need technicians and inspectors. The mix shifts over the life of a hull.
• New construction and repair do not move on the same clock. Construction ramps over years. Maintenance arrives in availability windows. CBO found that maintenance contracts are sometimes awarded only one or two months before work starts, which shipyards said can delay hiring.
• Concurrent programs can compete for the same trades. Where submarine, surface ship and repair work share a region, overlapping peaks can pull on the same welders, pipefitters and riggers, and on the experienced leads who supervise them.
• Suppliers have workforce needs too. GAO's finding on supplier workforce problems means a prime shipyard's labor plan can be on track while a critical supplier's is not.
• New infrastructure still needs operators. New dry docks, cranes and production lines require qualified people to run them safely and productively.

None of this proves a shortage at any given yard. It does mean workforce availability should be tracked with the same discipline as material availability and facility readiness.

Workforce implication: Labor is one of several execution constraints, and the one with the longest lead time. It belongs in program planning from the start.

Workforce Planning Needs to Follow Program Milestones

The most useful workforce plans start from what is actually on the schedule, not from headlines about total shipbuilding budgets.

For shipyard, ship repair and supplier leaders, a few questions help translate program status into workforce action:

• What work is contracted or scheduled? Separate funded, contracted and in-production work from requested or planned work.
• When does production begin, and when does it peak? Labor demand follows production milestones, not contract award dates.
• Which trades does each phase require? Forecast by trade and phase, not only by total headcount.
• Where do schedules overlap? Look for windows where construction, repair and modernization peaks coincide.
• Which skills are needed across several programs at once? Those are the trades to start recruiting first.
• How much lead time is available? Account for recruiting, weld testing, safety training and any site access requirements.
• What are suppliers and subcontractors facing? If they rely on the same trades in the same region, their constraints can become yours.
• What happens if the schedule moves? GAO and CBO findings show that schedules do shift. Plans should hold up if work starts late or runs long.

Programs that are moving forward create planning visibility. Leaders who use that visibility early have more options when the work arrives.